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REVIEW ESSAY

INTELLECTUAL THUGGERY

Jan van Tol

Mann, James. The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain
Away Chinese Repression. New York: Viking Penguin, 2007.
127pp. $19.95

Few contemporary national security subjects generate more controversy than
debates about, on the one hand, military implications of the growing strength of
China in most dimensions of national power and, on the other, the primacy of
promotion of democracy and such other “universal” principles as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy. Their confluence vis-à-vis American policy toward
China reveals a troubling inconsistency—or perhaps not so troubling to many.
This book is not about China per se but about the language that American
elites use about that policy. In his introduction, tellingly headed “Euphemizing
China,” Mann notes that
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it is about the language, images, hidden assumptions,
and questionable logic that powerful people—politicians, business executives, scholars, and diplomats—use when they discuss modern-day China. Over
many years, a collection of ideas, phrases, rationalizations, and doctrines has emerged, all of which serve to
deflect attention from the persistence of China’s
one-party state and its repression of political dissent.
One might think that the problems of China’s political
system would raise both moral questions and practical
ones, but apparently they don’t.

James Mann is a veteran journalist and foreign correspondent. Among other assignments, he served as
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Los Angeles Times Beijing bureau chief between 1984 and 1987. He is the author
of two other books on China as well as the recent best-selling Rise of the Vulcans:
The History of Bush’s War Cabinet.
Mann begins by describing two broad schools of thought encompassing most
contemporary views of China and its future development. The first, and dominant, view is the “Soothing Scenario,” which states as its main thesis that economic development will lead inexorably to far-reaching political change:
increasing trade and prosperity will eventually bring political liberalization to
China. This argument has been used consistently in bipartisan fashion to overcome those recurrent, awkward moments of regime repression that occasionally
threaten to arouse congressional and public ire.
The second school believes in the “Upheaval Scenario,” which states that
“China is headed for some sort of disaster, such as an economic collapse or political disintegration, because it will not be able to maintain political stability while
continuing on its current course.” Various proponents recite a litany of huge
problems facing China, such as rising political unrest, the fragility of its banking
system, and the huge and growing disparity between the rich coastal regions and
the poverty-ravaged interior. It is argued that preventing China from falling
apart has been a fundamental U.S. policy objective for over a century and that its
logic pertains today (leaving aside the question of what the United States could
actually do to influence it meaningfully). Thus anything that the United States
does that might further weaken Chinese leaders, such as criticizing them, is
unhelpful.
Mann suggests instead a third scenario. China could well continue its rise as a
formidable economic competitor and member in good standing of the “international community” and of its various organizations and yet continue to be a repressive, one-party state. In fact, Mann argues that this is far more likely than
either of the two widely accepted “scenarios,” since democracies consistently
have tended to underestimate the durability of stable authoritarian states.
More seriously, the comfortable syllogism of the Soothing Scenario (China is
now run by the Communist Party; China has an emerging middle class; when
these two forces collide, the party will give way to democracy) ignores the fact
that the urban coastal minority—that is, the emerging middle class—has every
incentive to protect the existing order and its own economic interests. Considering that the sixty-two million or so people living in China’s ten largest cities still
represent only 5 percent of the total Chinese population, why would one-man,
one-vote democracy prove especially compelling to this group?
This is reinforced, Mann argues, by the fact that American businesses and political elites have with their Chinese counterparts a commonality of interest in
maintaining the status quo. Chinese elites obviously benefit, but so do American
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business and political interests, the latter in the form of cheap imports and the
low interest rates and inflation enabled by huge Chinese investments in the U.S.
monetary vehicles that have resulted in widespread economic benefits that have
kept voters happy. Thus there is considerably less effective pressure from a
United States ostensibly committed to democracy and human rights than one
might expect.
Why does this matter? Mann offers three reasons. First, the Chinese deserve
political freedom like any other people, but they will not get it while “the country is still governed in an unrepresentative fashion by a Communist party with a
long, unsavory, violence-prone history, a love of its own privileges, and a
weakness for corruption.”
Second, the Chinese regime actively supports, or is at least friendly with, authoritarian regimes around the world like those in Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, Myanmar,
North Korea, and Putin’s Russia. “China gives what amounts to ideological sustenance to these dictatorships; it lends support to the idea that democracy is an alien
Western concept, something imposed by Americans or Europeans.” Indifference to
the nature of the regimes it supports considerably enhances the efficacy of its
“money diplomacy,” often to the disadvantage of the United States.
Third, “if China’s political system stays a permanently repressive one-party
state, that will mean that U.S. policy toward China since [at least] 1989 has been
sold to the American people on the basis of a fraud—that is, on the false premise
that trade and ‘engagement’ with China would change China’s political system.”
In other words, “day after day, American officials carry out policies based upon
premises about China’s future that are at best questionable and at worst downright false.”
The China Fantasy is especially useful in examining how language used to
support U.S. policy since the 1970s has been used to delegitimize opponents of
that policy. It has pithy compendiums of freighted terms (the “Lexicon of Dismissal”), descriptions of key underlying elite attitudes (the “Credo of the China
Elites”), and the “standard TV China graphics” that constitute the pictorial
shorthand for what most Americans think of when they imagine China. A separate chapter examines the language that each president since Richard Nixon has
used to explain and justify his China policy.
This short book is a superb, readable introduction to the major currents in
thinking about China policy over the past thirty years and as such is highly recommended reading for naval officers, especially younger officers, for whom the
rise of China will be a significant factor during their careers. Mann certainly
proffers a specific substantive point of view regarding the nature of the Chinese
regime (one shared by this reviewer), but the real value of the book is his
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examination of the often dishonest employment of language by American elites
to stifle debate.
Such intellectual thuggery—going beyond mere “political correctness”—is
an increasing plague in America (including within the Navy) generally. Mann’s
examination of that process at work makes for refreshing reading. After all, “not
fooling ourselves” ultimately depends on the capacity for robust, intellectually
honest debate.
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